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confrontation, against the interest of national security, represented by the denial
of confrontation. Admittedly, no one balance can be struck to insure justice in all
future cases, but certain guiding principles can, and should, be laid down. For
instance, where the information supplied to the Defense Department is not sworn
to by the informant under oath, the suspected employee should be accorded the
right to question the F.B.I. agent, or any other investigator who elicited the
information. Similarly, where the informant is not an undercover agent, he should
be brought before the employee at the hearing and cross-examined. This will, of
course, necessitate a change in existing regulations to empower the Hearing
Board to subpoena witnesses.. No such power now exists. Department of Defense
Directive, supra, §67.4-4(c): In a sentence, the choice between the interests of
security and liberty should be pre-disposed in favor of the citizens' liberty.
Ray Ellis Green
Heart-Balm Statute No Bar to Restitution of Property
An eighty-year old plaintiff sought the return of substantial cash gifts that
he bestowed upon a thirty-year old woman on the condition that she marry him,
which condition was broken. Her defense was based upon the Pennsylvania Heart-
Balm Statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 §171 (1935), which abolished actions
based upon breach of contract to marry. Held: the act did not affect contracts
subsidiary to the actual marriage compact and in no way discharged obligations
based upon a fulfillment of the marital contract. The plaintiff received restitution
of his property. Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1957).
Heart-Balm statutes have been a main line legislative attack at abuses of th6
law of contracts as applied to contracts of engagement to marry and the breach
thereof. In many jurisdictions today, in New York as well as Pennsylvania, prior
to 1935, the case books are full of decisions such as O'Brien v. Manning, 10
Misc. 123, 166 N.Y. Supp. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1917), that had awarded exorbitant
amounts to sorrowful young ladies who had claimed damages of the heart and mar-
riage market, caused usually by wealthy men who unwisely associated with them and
then paid-off to avoid the notoriety of such a law suit. The difficulty of proof as
to whether or not the contract was agreed upon at all, or who broke it, if it was
agreed upon, gave the courts much concern. Since there were seldom any
witnesses or written evidence of the agreement, the proof depended entirely
upon who gave the most convincing story. The juries in turn were never seriously
in doubt as to the path of justice when confronted with a weeping female
complainant
The states that have adopted a heart-balm statute remedy for such hapless
males are quite generally worded as are New York's and Pennsylvania's, "All causeb
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of action for breach of contract to marry are hereby abolished." PA. STAT. ANN.,
supra. New York varies in the wording of its statute slightly by adding that all
actions for damages for breach of contract to marry are abolished. N.Y. Cv.
PRAc. Acr §61-b. It it suggested that policy reasons behind heart-balm statutes
are obvious. The difficulty of proof, above mentioned, can lead to fraud upon the
court. Fraudulent complaints that essentially stem from the same atmosphere as
"Boudoir Promises," when the plaintiff seeks either to gain her benefits through
a forced marriage and its consequent status obligations, or a handy settlement in
or out of court. In preventing the advent of such fraud and duress upon
prospective defendants, the legislators directly encouraged more freedom of
marriage. When a bar has been put up against money-saving marriages, the courts
save many possible divorce litigations and family unhappiness in general
As close as the New York and Pennsylvania statutes read, the case at hand
points up a wide divergence of judicial interpretation in the two states. This is
true especially as to actions for property settlement based on breach of such
contracts. The leading New York case is Andie -v. Kaplan, 263 App. Div. 884,
32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 685, 43
N.E.2d 82 (1942). This case involved a suit by plaintiff to recover two pieces
of jewelry worth $435 and $600 that were given by him to the defendant on a
mutual promise of marriage between the parties. The court refused to allow the
action, stating that it was barred by N.Y. Civ. PRAc AcT §61-b. The only writing
that is recorded for this leading case is a memorandum dissent by Justices Lazansky
and Taylor in which they said that the action should not be barred by the statute
because: "The purpose of the new legislation was to prevent a recovery for al-
leged pecuniary loss, blighted affections, wounded pride, humiliation, and the like,
against the one who violated the promise, but not to enable the latter to receive
benefits out of his wilfull act." This dissenting view evidently carried some weight
with the legislative authorities. In 1947, the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion suggested an amendment to the Civil Practice Act by proposing §61-j which
read:
This article shall not be deemed to prevent a court in a proper case
from granting restitution of property or money transferred in contempla-
tion of the performance of an agreement to marry which is not per-
formed. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N. Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION,
1947, p. 227.
The amendment quite clearly refers to the common law rule allowing re-
covery of property in suits for breach of contract to marry. An interesting question
is, what property was allowed to be recovered and by whom? A relatively recent
English decision would not allow the man to recover the engagement ring if it
were he who broke the engagement. But the court said, "If a woman who has
received a ring refuses to fulfill the conditions of the gift, she must return it."
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Cohen v. Sellar, [19261 1 K.B. 536. In the Pavlicic case, supra, the plaintiff was
allowed to recover over $10,000 worth of cash and property, but the question
arises as to small amounts that may be in the nature of gifts. In a recent New
Hampshire case the court allowed recovery of an engagement ring but refused to
allow recovery of clothing, toiletries and, ".... personal gratuities upon which the
law imposes no condition of return, and are more nearly akin to a Christmas
present." Gikas v. Nicholas, 96 N.H. 177, 71 A.2d 785 (1950).
If the New York Heart-Balm statute was to be revised to allow recovery
of property in certain cases, the above difficulties would have to be ironed out,
but it certainly seems obvious that in cases involving engagement rings, the in-
nocent donor should be allowed recovery. Again in the Pavlicic case, supra, where
there is a proven fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant and a great dis-
crepancy in age that, belles- undue influence, there is proof enough to find proper
grounds for restitution. But despite the above circumstances that can and do per-
vade engagement relationships, the proposed amendment, even though passed by
the New York Legislature, met its lasting doom on a sweep of the governor's
veto pen in that same year of 1947. The governor's disapproval was unfortunately
not accompanied by. a memorandum.
Thus at the present time, New York has the dubious distinction of depriving
injured parties of a remedy for the enforcement of property rights growing out
of contracts of marriage engagement. Under the view that has prevailed since
the Andie v.Kaplan decision, supra, the Heart-Balm statute not only bars action
for damages for breach of contract to marry, but any other action which requires
proof of the promise to marry. Gifts in contemplation of marriage may not be
recovered even though enrichment may result to the donee.
The singular inroad that has been made by a few New York lower court
jurisdictions, to the Andiewr. Kaplan doctrine, has been to allow restitution upon
proof of a mutual recission of the marriage contract and a new contract to return the
property given. Morris v. Baird, 269 App. Div. 948, 57 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't
1945); Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 39 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1943). This is New York's only concession to its strict heart-balm attitude.
It seems, in the light of this recent Pennsylvania case, supra, that New York
State would benefit by a re-evaluation of their heart-balm policy, at least benefit
to the extent of realizing the inequities such a broad interpretation necessarily
fosters in an attempt to squelch very similar inequities. This result could not
have Been intended by the legislature in enacting the Heart-Balm Statute and it
wi not properly serve the interests of the people of this state as presently in-
terpreted. The New York Law Revision Commission's suggested amendment to
the Heart-Balm Statute should be reintroduced. This amendment, if adopted,
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would return our courts to the common law interpretation of restitution of pro-
perty rights for an innocent donor. However, even if the donor who was not in-
nocent was allowed to recover, would not one of the basic policies of the heart-
balm legislation still be served, that of reducing the economic duress that can in-
fluence unwilling marriages? It seems that in the area of restitution of property
rights that legislation might even forge on beyond the common law recovery
notions, without any detriment to heart-balm policies, and even with- a chance
at greater promotion of those same policies.
William Sugnet
Use of Declaratory Judgment to Determine the Validity of
a Foreign ex parte Divorce
Plaintiff-wife, a New York resident, was legally separated from the
defendant-husband who was an alleged resident of New York State at all times.
The defendant obtained a Mexican divorce without the appearance of the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, pronouncing the
Mexican divorce decree invalid for lack of jurisdiction and declaring that she was
still th6 defendant's lawful wife. Upon hearing of a motion to dismiss the
compleint for failure to state a cause of action, held: a doubtful Mexican divorce
decree is grounds for a declaratory judgment to determine marital status, and
remarriage of one of the parties is not a prerequisite for such a declaratory
judgment. Grutman v. Grutman, 7 Misc.2d 236, 166 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct.
1957.)
In New York State, the marital status of the parties is a proper subject
matter for a declaratory judgment. Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197, 192 N.E. 291
1934). The grant of a declaratory judgment lies in judicial discretion, but is not
to be granted without substantial grounds. Engel v. Engel, 275 App. Div. 14,
87 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1949). The problem in this area of law is the determin-
ation of what circumstances produce substantial grounds for a declaratory judgment.
A separation decree adjudicates an existing marital status only at the time of
the decree. Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 672, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1957).
If the divorce decreelwas prior to the separation decree, its invalidity would have
been adjudicated by necessity and an action for a declaratory judgment would be
rejected as superfluous. Garvin v. Garvin, 306 N.Y. 118, 116 N.E.2d 73 (1951).
However, a separation decree cannot decide what has not yet come into
existence. A separation decree does not foreclose the possibility of a later divorce
and would not affect the possibility of a declaratory judgment action attacking
the later divorce.
